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RESUMEN (MÁXIMO: 150 PALABRAS) 
 
O artigo analisa o impacto de factores políticos na distribuição das transferências do Governo para os municípios portuguesas e se este se 
alterou à medida que a democracia portuguesa se foi consolidando. É utilizada uma extensa e detalhada base de dados que cobre todos os 
municípios de Portugal continental, de 1979 a 2002.  
 
Os resultados empíricos revelam que os factores políticos condicionam a distribuição das transferências e que a sua influência se alterou 
ao longo do tempo. Enquanto manipulações políticas na afectação das transferências entre os municípios parecem existir apenas nos 
primeiros anos da democracia portuguesa, os aumentos das transferências em anos eleitorais são maiores na segunda metade do período 
temporal analisado. É argumentado que este último efeito se deve a uma alteração no ambiente político e à falta de informação dos 
eleitores sobre o processo de distribuição das transferências entre diferentes níveis de governo em Portugal.  
 
 1
The Political Economy of Intergovernmental Grants:  
Evidence from Portugal 
 
by 
 
Linda Gonçalves Veiga* 
Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) 
Universidade do Minho 
P-4710-057 Braga - Portugal 
Tel: +351-253604568 
Fax: +351-253676375 
E-mail: linda@eeg.uminho.pt 
 
and 
Maria Manuel Pinho 
Faculdade de Economia 
Universidade do Porto 
P-4200-464 Porto - Portugal 
Tel: +351-225571100 
Fax: +351-225505050 
E-mail: mpinho@fep.up.pt 
 
Abstract: 
We evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental 
grants in Portugal, as it matured from a young to an established democracy. We 
use a large and unexplored dataset covering all mainland municipalities from 1979 
to 2002. Empirical results show that political variables condition the granting 
system, and that their importance changed over time. While political manipulation 
in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early 
years of democracy, opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years of the 
sample. We argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political 
environment and to a lack of information on intergovernmental grants by voters. 
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1. Introduction 
Working with a large cross-section of countries, Brender and Drazen (2005) 
argued that empirical evidence of a political budget cycle exists but that result is 
driven by a group of “new democracies” (Portugal, Greece, Spain and Turkey). 
Since democracy was reestablished in Portugal in 1974, the country has evolved 
from a “new” to an “established” democracy, which makes it an appropriate 
laboratory for further investigation of Brender and Drazen’s findings. Furthermore, 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), analyzing political budget cycles in Russia 
after its transition to democracy, have found that the magnitude of the cycles 
decreased over time. While Russia is a decade-old democracy, young by all 
standards, democracy was reestablished in Portugal thirty years ago, allowing us to 
analyze a substantially longer time horizon and to observe a transition from a new 
to an established democracy. 
In this article we evaluate the influence of political forces on the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants in Portugal, using a large, detailed, and unexplored 
dataset covering all mainland municipalities from 1979 to 2002. The institutional 
structure of local governments and the policy instruments available are identical for 
all localities in Portugal, making this panel preferable to one composed of several 
countries, or states, with different institutions and policy instruments, like the one 
used by Brender and Drazen (2005). The study of intergovernmental grants is very 
relevant because transfers from the central government represent the main source 
of funding of municipalities1. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the institutional framework in which the flow of 
intergovernmental grants from the central to municipal governments is determined. 
Sections 4 and 5 describe the dataset and the baseline empirical model, 
                                                          
1 Since there are no states or administrative regions in mainland Portugal, municipalities are the highest 
ranking authorities below the national government. 
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respectively. Section 6 presents the empirical results and, finally, section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The literature 
The theory of fiscal federalism2 provides a normative framework for the 
assignment of functions to different levels of the public sector, as well as for the 
achievement of a balance between responsibilities and resources of each 
governmental level. Different levels of government typically have access to tax and 
debt instruments, but there is another important way to allocate funds among 
different levels of the public sector: intergovernmental grants. The normative 
approach to such grants assumes that the central government is mainly motivated 
by efficiency and equity goals, seeking the maximization of the general welfare of 
the population. In this context, the settlement of grants is mainly supported by 
formulas, which use indicators of the needs of the population and of local fiscal 
capacity. 
The economics literature has also provided some positive explanations for 
the allocation of intergovernmental grants. Among these, approaches that 
emphasize the importance of political factors deserve particular attention. In this 
view, the policies conducted by the central government are determined, at least 
partly, by its attempt to promote its own interests and by lobbying activities. 
When choosing among alternative policies, a government will adopt the one 
that maximizes its utility, which might simply depend upon the probability of 
reelection. In this context, the economics literature has analyzed the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants as a strategic tool of central governments aimed at re-
                                                          
2 See Oates (1999) for a survey on fiscal federalism. 
 4
election. This is in accordance with the literature on rational political business cycles 
and “pork-barrel” politics3. 
Previous empirical research has investigated a number of hypotheses related 
to the political forces that affect the amount and distribution of intergovernmental 
grants. Worthington and Dollery (1998) tested whether the aggregate amount of 
resources diverted to local jurisdictions differs in national electoral years, and other 
research has investigated a series of hypotheses related to the political forces that 
affect the distribution of grants across municipalities. First, researchers have tested 
whether central governments reward their supporters, who are more likely to 
distribute “pork” and engage in political patronage, or their opponents, whom they 
might wish to “buy off” (Gist and Hill, 1984; Alperovich, 1984; Bungey et al., 1991; 
Grossman, 1994; Pereira, 1996; Worthington and Dollery, 1998). Second, others 
have investigated whether jurisdictions with a larger or smaller representation at 
the national parliament are treated differently, either because they have larger 
population and, therefore, more political capital available (votes), or, because they 
have a smaller population, and therefore potential for a larger increase in per capita 
grant benefits (Wright, 1974; Bungey et al., 1991; Grossman, 1994; Worthington 
and Dollery, 1998; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001). Third, it is possible that 
jurisdictions with more competitive races for the national government or with more 
swing voters receive a higher proportion of intergovernmental grants, other things 
equal (Wright, 1974; Bungey et al., 1991; Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003). Finally, 
others have tested whether jurisdictions where the party in the national 
government received a higher proportion of votes in legislative elections receive 
more resources (grants) because they are considered “pivotal” to win a majority of 
seats in the national parliament (Case, 2001). 
                                                          
3 According to rational opportunistic business cycles models, such as those presented in Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), incumbents relax fiscal policy before balloting periods to increase their 
reelection chances. See Drazen (2000: 327-331) for an explanation of “pork-barrel” politics. 
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Deviations from normative considerations in the allocation of grants may 
also result from lobbying activities. First, local politicians may pressure the central 
government to transfer a larger amount of resources during local election years in 
order to have more funds available for campaigning (Worthington and Dollery, 
1998). Second, the design of grant distribution formulae is subject to political 
pressures since it results from negotiations between central and local governments 
(Grossman, 1994; Pereira, 1996). Third, interest groups, such as public employees 
and unions, may lobby for benefits in the distribution of grants that are not 
formula-determined (Grossman, 1994; Bork and Owings, 2003; Lowry and Potoski, 
2004; Feld and Schaltegger, 2005). Fourth, the costs borne by local governments 
in lobbying the central government may vary according to the geographical and 
“political” distance from the central government capital (Bork and Owings, 2003). 
Fifth, fiscal referenda may restrict the impact of interest groups in the 
determination of intergovernmental grants (Feld and Schaltegger, 2005). 
With the exception of Bungey et al. (1991), all the above-mentioned studies 
present evidence that politics matter in the intergovernmental grants allocation 
process. To our knowledge, there is only one article, Pereira (1996), that 
investigates the determinants of intergovernmental grants in Portugal using a 
political-economic approach. In this paper we try to shed some additional light on 
the influence of political forces in the Portuguese granting system. We enlarge 
Pereira’s analysis by investigating additional hypotheses and by using a larger 
dataset, both in cross-sectional and temporal dimensions. 
Portugal is also an interesting case study because it is a relatively young 
democracy, and to date most of the research has focused on established 
democracies. Recently, Brender and Drazen (2005), working with a large cross-
section of countries, presented evidence that political budget cycles exist, but the 
result is driven by the experience of a group of “new democracies”, where Portugal 
was included. They argued that fiscal manipulation may work better in “new” than 
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in “established” democracies because voters may be inexperienced with electoral 
politics or may have less information available to evaluate the fiscal manipulation. 
Brender (2003) and Akhmedov and Zhurasvskaya (2004) found evidence consistent 
with this view for Israel and Russia respectively. Since the first democratic elections 
(both legislative and municipal) took place in 1976, and our dataset starts in 1979 
we have an excellent laboratory to test whether the impact of political forces in the 
grant allocation process changed as democracy matured in the country. 
 
3. The Portuguese political and institutional framework 
After almost fifty years of dictatorship, democracy was re-established in 
Portugal following the April 25th, 1974 revolution. From 1974 to 1987, several 
governments ruled, but none succeeded in staying in office for an entire four-year 
term. In the 1987 elections, after two years in office as a minority government, a 
single party - the People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) - 
won a majority of parliamentary seats for the first time since the re-establishment 
of democracy. It repeated as a majority government in the subsequent balloting 
held in 1991. At the end of 1995, the party in office changed again: the socialist 
party (PS) won the elections and stayed in office until 2002. After that, the country 
was ruled by a coalition formed by PPD/PSD and Democratic and Social Center / 
People’s Party (CDS/PP). Following a Presidential dismissal of the government, 
elections were called for February 2005. The country is currently run by the PS, 
which has a comfortable overall majority of seats in the National Assembly. See 
table 1 for a description of parties in office since the 1979. 
[Table 1] 
The first Portuguese municipal elections were held in 1976 and since then 
eight ballotings have taken place. Until 1985, municipal elections occurred every 
three years, and after that municipal governments’ terms were extended to four 
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years. Elections have always taken place in December, with the exception of the 
most recent one, which occurred in October 20054. 
The Portuguese Constitution of 1976, the Local Power Law (Law n. 79/77, 
October 25) and the first Local Finance Law (Law n. 1/79, January 2) brought new 
responsibilities and more power to municipalities, allowing for local finance reform 
through the consolidation of the financial decentralization. However, tax collection 
has been mainly a central government task and transfers from the central 
government represent the most important source of funding for Portuguese 
municipalities. Municipalities receive both conditional and unconditional grants. 
Conditional grants provide more control for the central government and less 
discretion for municipalities than unconditional grants. Conditional grants from the 
central government to municipalities are usually governed by contracts and specific 
program requirements5. The European Union’s funds are a special case of 
conditional grants. They are allocated to each municipality by a central government 
agency that must follow the EU guidelines in the selection of the projects to be 
financed. 
For unconditional grants, the discretion of the grant giver is more limited 
since, in the Portuguese case, these grants are determined by a fiscal rule and are 
formula-based transfers. According to the Portuguese Constitution, municipalities 
have the right to share national fiscal revenues. Table 2 summarizes the changes 
that occurred in the allocation criteria of unconditional grants. 
[Table 2] 
                                                          
4 Municipal elections took place at December 12, 1976; December 16, 1979; December 12, 1982; 
December 15, 1985; December 17, 1989; December 12, 1993; December 14, 1997; December 16, 
2001; and October 9, 2005.  
5 The first Local Finance Law mentioned the possibility of conditional financial help from the central 
government to municipalities in case of public disaster or unusual circumstances. The Law n. 1/87 
considered the possibility of technical and financial cooperation between the central government and 
municipalities aiming at the promotion of regional and local development. In 1998, a new Local Finance 
Law was enacted allowing for help from the central government if regional development was at stake or 
if there was an urgent need for funds that could not be provided by the municipality. The regulatory 
framework for conditional financial help is established by the central government in the form of decree-
laws (legislation issued by the government by permission from the Parliament). 
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We now proceed by reviewing changes in the legislation since 1979 defining 
the total amount of funds to be transferred to municipalities. Law n. 1/79 required 
that total unconditional grants to municipalities constitute no less than 18% of the 
amount allocated to capital and current expenditures in the National Budget. 
Therefore, the total amount of grants, though constrained by law, was not 
completely formula-driven; it was published each year in the National Budget Law. 
Grants resulted from the municipalities’ right to share tax revenues collected at the 
central level (artº 5º.b) and other revenues (artº 5º.c). The 1987 Local Finance 
Law changed the way the total amount of unconditional grants was determined by 
establishing that it should be annually adjusted on the basis of the expected change 
in the value-added tax (VAT) revenue6, as expressed in the National Budget. Since 
this rule relied on expectations, there was still room for electoral politics to 
influence the total amount of grants. 
In 1998, a new law was approved (Law n. 42/98) that created the Municipal 
General Fund (Fundo Geral Municipal, FGM) and the Municipal Cohesion Fund 
(Fundo de Coesão Municipal, FCM)7. The total amount of these funds was set as a 
proportion (30.5%: 24% for FGM and 6.5% for FCM) of the actual tax revenues 
generated two years before by income taxes and the value-added tax. This 
represents an important change from the previous local finance law that based the 
determination of the total amount of unconditional grants on expected tax 
collections. The National Budget Law of 2001 created a new fund to complement 
the FGM and the FCM: the Municipal Basis Fund (Fundo de Base Municipal, FBM), 
which allocates an equal amount of resources per municipality8. The total amount of 
these funds still represents 30.5% of the actual tax revenues generated two years 
                                                          
6 Unconditional Grantst = Unconditional Grantst-1*(VATt/VATt-1).  
7 The FGM was created to provide municipalities with adequate financial resources for the execution of 
their tasks, as a function of their levels of operation and investment. The FCM intends to promote 
horizontal balance, that is, to reduce inequity among local jurisdictions. This fund is only transferred to 
municipalities that have a development index below the national average. 
8 As can be seen from table 2, previous local finance laws already assigned an equal amount of funds to 
all municipalities but not as an autonomous fund. 
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before by the income taxes, and the value-added tax, but the proportions for 
component funds are now 20.5% for FGM, 5.5% for FCM, and 4.5% for FBM. 
 
4. The dataset 
We use as our laboratory a large and unexplored dataset containing 
information on all Portuguese mainland municipalities (278) from 1979 to 20029. 
Data on total transfers from the central government to the local authorities and 
municipalities’ area were obtained from the Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais’s 
annual report called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report exists 
from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2002. For the two missing years, data were 
obtained directly from the municipalities’ official accounts. For these two years the 
dataset is incomplete: we have 175 observations for 1984 and 180 for 1985. Data 
on non-formula grants were obtained from the same sources but is available for a 
shorter span: from 1984 to 2002.  
Data on total population and population by age groups in each municipality 
were obtained from the Portuguese National Statistics Office (Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística – INE) Census operations that took place in 1981, 1991 and 2001. For 
the remaining years data on total population were collected from INE’s Estimates of 
Resident Population. Data on population by age groups were obtained by assuming 
a constant growth rate for the period 1979-1989, on the basis of the 1970 and 
1981’ Census operations; for the rest of the period, annual data was acquired from 
the INE’s Estimates of Resident Population. Gross Domestic Product and consumer 
price indexes were acquired from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics. 
                                                          
9 Overseas municipalities, belonging to the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira were excluded 
from the analysis since there is an intermediate level (the regional government) between them and the 
central government, they benefit from the status of ultraperiferic regions in terms of EU funds, and the 
inhabitants of islands may have specific needs. 
Regarding the Portuguese geographical organization, one should mention that during the period analyzed 
four municipalities were created: Amadora, in 1979, and Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela, in 1998. 
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Political data, namely election dates and municipal and legislative electoral 
results, were obtained from the National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional 
de Eleições) and from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral 
Process (Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral - STAPE) of 
the Internal Affairs Ministry. 
 
5. The baseline empirical model 
In this section we empirically investigate the politico-economic aspects of 
the grant allocation process. We model real per capita grants to municipalities 
(GRANTit) as a function of (1) lags of the dependent variable since grant programs 
are likely to persist over a number of years, as are the political and normative 
factors that impact upon such grants; (2) a vector of variables related to the public 
choice idea that policymakers take into account their personal political interests in 
the grant allocation process (PUB_CHOICEit); and, (3) a vector of control variables 
associated with the normative approach, that views the grant giver as a social 
welfare maximizer (NORMit). 
The dependent variable, GRANTit, is defined in per capita terms in order to 
take into account size differences among municipalities and avoid 
heteroskedasticity problems. It is measured in 1995 euros to control for price 
increases over time. We first consider the total amount of grants transferred to 
municipalities and then investigate those that are not formula-determined10. 
 The first vector of variables (PUB_CHOICEit) consists of political variables 
that allow us to test if grant givers are self-motivated and if local incumbents’ 
pressures influence the granting process. The following variables were considered: 
- MUN_ELECTit: dummy variable equal to one in municipal election years, and to 
zero in the other years. We hypothesize that mayors lobby the central 
                                                          
10 Levin-Lin-Chu and Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root tests reject the hypothesis that total grants and 
non-formula grants are non-stationary. 
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government in order to receive a larger amount of funds during municipal 
election years, so that more resources are available for vote-enhancing 
expenditures11. Grants allow for an expansion of vote-generating expenditures 
without a need for additional vote-losing taxation. A positive sign is expected 
for the coefficient associated with this variable. 
- LEG_ELECTit: dummy variable equal to one in legislative election years, and to 
zero in the remaining years. It is our belief that, in order to increase its 
popularity, the central government is likely to transfer a larger amount of funds 
to municipalities in legislative election years. However, if we follow the 
Worthington and Dollery (1998: 306) argument that the returns from 
purchasing political capital by increasing transfers to local jurisdictions may be 
off-set by direct returns to central government politicians resulting from 
increases in national public expenditures, a negative coefficient should be 
expected. 
- SAME_PARTYit: dummy variable that takes the value of one when the mayor 
and the prime-minister belong to the same political party. This variable allows 
us to test if similarity of party affiliation between local and central politicians 
influences the amount of grants transferred to a municipality. We have no prior 
for the sign of the estimated coefficient associated with this variable. The 
central government may try to reward its supporters, under the hypothesis that 
they are likely to deliver more political support (votes) in exchange for grants, 
or it may try to buy off its opponents12. 
- YEARS_IN_OFFICEit: number of years that a mayor has been in office13. Since 
mayors’ expertise and knowledge of the granting process is likely to increase 
                                                          
11 Recall that during the period analyzed municipal elections in Portugal always took place in December. 
12 In Portugal, the number of deputies of the National Assembly elected by each electoral circle is 
determined according to the respective share of the national population. In mainland Portugal, there are 
eighteen electoral circles. Since electoral circles do not coincide with municipalities, our data does not 
allow us to test whether jurisdictions with a larger representation at the national parliament are treated 
differently in the allocation of grants. 
13 There are no term limits in Portugal. 
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with time in office, we expect their ability to extract funds from the central 
government to increase with the number of years in office. Therefore, a 
positive coefficient is expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this 
variable. 
The second group of explanatory variables (NORMit) consists of demographic 
and economic variables that allow us to test if the granting process strives for 
improvements of social welfare. These variables proxy the macroeconomic situation 
of the country, and capture differences in local population needs. The following 
variables are included in this vector: 
-  POPULATIONit-1 and POPULATION_SQit-1: represent, respectively, the 
municipalities’ population (in thousands) and population squared, both 
measured in the previous year. The existence of economies of scale in the 
provision of services by local governments constitutes a rationale for per capita 
grants to decrease with communities’ size. Since larger jurisdictions can 
provide identical public service levels with lower taxes, the central government 
should transfer fewer resources to them in order to promote horizontal equity. 
However, some authors have criticized this argument based on the idea that 
local public goods may have “privateness” characteristics14. 
- %POP_UNDER15it-1 and %POP_OVER65 it-1: percentage of the population under 
15 and over 65 years old in the previous year. The estimated coefficients 
associated with these variables are expected to be positive because these 
groups of the population demand specific services typically provided by local 
authorities, such as elementary education and facilities for the elderly. 
- GDPit-1: per capita GDP at 1995 prices. The macroeconomic performance of the 
country conditions tax revenues collected by the central government and, 
consequently, the amount of funds transferred to municipalities. A positive sign 
is expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this variable. 
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In this vector, all variables are lagged one year because it takes some time 
for demographic and economic data to be released and for policymakers to take 
them into account in the grants allocation process. Table 3 presents descriptive 
statistics for all variables used in the empirical work. 
[Table 3] 
The baseline empirical model is described in equation (1), where t 
represents the year, i the municipality, p the number of lags of the dependent 
variable included in the model15, αj is a parameter to be estimated, β and γ are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated, υi is the individual effect of municipality i, 
and εit is the error term: 
GRANTit = ∑
=
p
1j
jα GRANTi,t-j + PUB_CHOICE’it β + NORM’it γ + υi + εit 
   i = 1 …, N; t = 1,…,T (1) 
The model described above could be estimated assuming municipalities’ 
individual effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent 
variable would be correlated with the error term, εit, even if the latter was not 
serially correlated, leading to inconsistent model estimates. This would occur 
because there is a clear dominance of cross sections (N=275)16 over time periods 
(T=24) in our sample. 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator to solve these problems. By first differencing equation (1) 
individual effects (υi) are removed and the resulting equation becomes estimable by 
instrumental variables: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 For a discussion on this issue see Pereira (1996). 
15 The optimal number of lags was determined according to their statistical significance and the absence 
of auto-correlation. 
16 When taking lags and first-differences, the observations for the three municipalities created in 1998 
(Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) are dropped, leading to a panel of 275 municipalities and 24 years of 
observations. 
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∆GRANTit = ∆∑
=
p
1j
jα GRANTi,t-j + ∆PUB_CHOICE’it β + ∆NORM’it γ + ∆εit 
 i = 1 …, N;   t = 1,…,T (2) 
The valid instruments are levels of the dependent variable, lagged two or more 
periods; levels of the endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods; levels of 
the pre-determined variables, lagged one or more periods; and the levels of the 
exogenous variables, current or lagged or, simply, the first differences of the 
exogenous variables. More moment conditions are available if we assume that the 
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual effects. In this case, the 
first lags of these variables can be used as instruments in the levels equation. 
When the dependent variable and/or the independent variables are persistent, 
lagged differences of the dependent variable may also be valid instruments for the 
levels equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this extended GMM estimator 
is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991)17 in this particular case. 
 
6. Empirical results 
In this section we describe the results of our empirical analysis. We start by 
investigating the total amount of grants received by municipalities (expressed in 
real and per capita terms) and, then, we proceed to study grants that are not 
determined by formulae (also in real per capita terms). Finally, we test if political 
effects changed over time, as the country evolved from a new to an established 
democracy. All equations were estimated by the method system-GMM for linear 
dynamic panel data models. The variable measuring the number of years mayors 
have been in office was treated as an endogenous variable because transfers from 
the central government represent an important source of funding for local 
governments, and spending decisions are likely to have an impact on electoral 
results. In equations for total grants, the instruments used for the lagged 
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dependent variable and the endogenous variable (number of years in office) were 
levels of these variables lagged 2 to 5 periods in the equation in first differences18, 
and once lagged first differences in the equation in levels. For non-formula grants 
equations the same instruments were used, but it was necessary to add levels 
lagged 6 to 8 periods of the dependent and the endogenous variable in order to 
have valid Sargan tests. Tables 4 to 6 report the two-step results using robust 
standard errors corrected for finite samples19. 
 
Total grants 
Column 1 of table 4 shows estimates of our “baseline” model for total grants 
that includes all variables described in the previous section. Several findings are 
immediately evident. First, the statistical significance of lagged grants suggests that 
they are subject to considerable inertia20. Second, of the four variables considered 
in the political vector, three turned out to be statistically significant. As predicted by 
the literature on political business cycles and “pork-barrel” politics hypothesis, 
grants increase during election years. It is important to recall that only after the 
local finance law of 1998, the total amount of unconditional grants started to be 
determined by a formula based on actual tax revenues collected two years before. 
Before that it was based on expectations for the tax revenues or set as a 
percentage of the National Budget expenditures. Therefore, the central government 
could easily manipulate the total amount of the “pork” to be distributed. Results 
indicate that, for all else equal, total grants per capita increase by 8.68 1995 euros 
                                                                                                                                                                          
17 Since there is some persistence of transfers and of some independent variables, it is appropriate to 
estimate this system-GMM. Furthermore, difference Sargan tests indicate that, for our data, the system-
GMM is preferable to the GMM that only includes the first-differenced equations. 
18 Smaller numbers of lagged levels in the equations in first differences generally lead to the rejection of 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions (p-values of the Sargan test below 0.1). All equations were 
also estimated including all available instruments, and results were essentially the same. Although there 
is a gain in efficiency when all available instruments are used, there is a loss of power, since we get weak 
instruments in the long lags. 
19 Although it is more common to present the one-step results because the two-step standard errors are 
generally biased downwards, that problem does not apply to our case, since the econometric software 
PcGive 10.4 uses the finite-sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2005). Thus, we present the 
two-step results, as these are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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in municipal election years, a relative increase (compared to the sample mean) of 
3.6%. This is in accordance with our prior that mayors’ lobby to receive more 
grants during balloting years in order to have more funds available for electoral 
campaigns and vote-enhancing expenditures21. During legislative election years 
total grants per capita also increase by 10.85 euros, an increase of 4.5 %. As 
suggested by the “pork-barrel” politics, the decision maker (central government) 
increases the amount of grants distributed to local governments to improve its 
popularity, and therefore, its likelihood of reelection. Furthermore, the data 
suggests that the longer a mayor has been in office, the larger the amount of 
grants received by his municipality. This may reflect a mayor’s accumulation of 
knowledge on how the Portuguese granting system works, and consequently, a 
stronger ability to extract a larger share of the distributed funds from the grant 
giver. Our estimates also indicate that municipalities run by mayors that belong to 
the prime-minister’s party are not favored in the grant distribution process.  
[Table 4] 
Third, regarding the variables related to the normative approach to 
transfers, results indicate that grants per capita decline as the size of the 
community increases, until the population reaches about 450 thousand inhabitants. 
As expected, grants per capita increase with the percentage of individuals under 15 
and over 65 years old, suggesting that more funds are transferred to satisfy the 
specific needs of these two groups of the population. GDP per capita, included to 
capture the macroeconomic performance of the country, also has the expected sign 
and is highly statistically significant. 
Given the finding that grant funding rises in election years, we decided to 
investigate whether or not these increases are more pronounced towards 
                                                                                                                                                                          
20 The choice of the number of lags to include was based on their statistical significance and on the need 
to avoid second order autocorrelation of the residuals.  
21 Veiga and Veiga’s (2004) empirical results reveal Portuguese mayors’ opportunistic behaviour, who 
increase, in pre-electoral periods, expenditure items highly visible to the electorate, such as investment 
expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works, and rural roads. 
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municipalities led by mayors that belong to the prime-minister’s party. For 
legislative elections, our prior was that increases would be stronger for 
municipalities ruled by politicians of the central government’s political party, since 
they are more likely to engage in political patronage that increases the probabilities 
of reelection of the former. In order to test this hypothesis, we interacted the 
dummy variables for the municipal (MUN_ELECT) and legislative (LEG_ELECT) 
election years with the dummies SAME_PARTY and DIF_PARTY (1-SAME_PARTY). 
Results presented in column 2 reveal that, for municipal elections, both interactions 
are statistically significant and that the coefficient for “same-party” mayors is 
smaller than that for “different-party” mayors. However, a Wald test does not allow 
us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients between the two interaction 
variables. For legislative elections, the interaction variables were highly statistically 
significant, but the coefficient associated with same-party governments is now 
larger and statistically different from that for different-party governments. The 
coefficient for the same-party municipalities is almost twice that for different-party 
municipalities. In this case, a Wald test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal 
coefficients for the two interaction variables. 
Finally we tested if increases in transfers are also visible in the year 
preceding an election. Results, presented in column 3, reveal that this occurs for 
both municipal and legislative elections. Since some investments may take several 
months to be finished and become visible by voters, it is not surprising that 
transfers start increasing in the year before an election.   
 
Non-formula grants 
Taking into account that a significant amount of transfers to municipalities 
are distributed according to a formula-based fiscal rule (recall table 2), we 
continued our empirical analysis by investigating non-formula grants. As already 
mentioned, the time span of available data is smaller: 1984 to 2002. 
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[Table 5] 
Evidence reported in table 5 confirms our prior that non-formula grants are 
more subject to political influences. The percentage increase in non-formula grants 
during electoral years is now of 14.1% for municipal elections, and of 4.7% for 
legislative elections – in both cases a higher increase than for total grants. The 
relative impact of an additional year a mayor has been in office is also larger (0.6% 
for total grants, 1.1% for non-formula grants). Despite having more discretionary 
power over this type of transfers the central government does not seem to 
discriminate across municipalities according to the mayors’ party affiliation. The 
dummy variable SAME_PARTY turned out not to be statistically significant, as in the 
case for total grants. Concerning the vector of normative variables, results reveal 
that estimated coefficients for POPULATION, POPULATION_SQ, %POP_OVER65, and 
GDP were signed as before and continued to be statistically significant. We can 
therefore conclude that the central government takes into account the specific 
needs of the municipalities, as well as the macroeconomic situation of the country, 
when allocating grant funds. 
To test the robustness of the conclusion that over the entire term, 
partisanship has not influenced the grants’ distribution process, we added to our 
baseline model a variable measuring the percentage of votes the party in the 
central government had in the previous legislative electoral balloting, in the 
municipality. As can be seen in column 2, this variable turned out not to be 
statistically significant. An alternative variable, expressing the number of votes (in 
thousands) for the party in the national government, also turned out not to be 
statistically significant (column 3). 
As done for total grants, we interacted the dummy variables for the electoral 
years with the dummies SAME_PARTY and DIF_PARTY. Results reported in column 
4 of table 5 are essentially the same as before. We can, therefore, conclude that 
party similarity between local and central governments only seems to be a relevant 
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issue during legislative election years. Unlike total grants, non-formula grants do 
not start increasing in the year preceding an election (column 5). 
 
Political effects over time 
Following Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding that in a large sample of 
countries the political budget cycle was driven by the group of “new democracies”, 
where Portugal was included, we decided to investigate whether the impact of 
political factors changed from the early years of democracy to the latter ones. 
Taking into account that before 1987 none of the governments managed to stay in 
office for the entire term (recall table 1) and that after that three governments 
completed their mandates, two of them with the support of a majority of deputies 
in Parliament, we adopted the 1987 election as our breaking point. That is, we 
classify the period from 1974 to 1987 as “new democracy”22 and after that as 
“established democracy”. We then interacted all of the political variables with 
dummies for these two periods (NEW_DEM and ESTAB_DEM). We report the results 
only for total grants (table 6), since for non-formula grants the sample starts only 
in 1984, and there are many missing values in 1984 and 1985, so that little of the 
“new democracy” period is covered. 
[Table 6] 
Regarding party similarity between the mayor and the prime-minister, and 
the experience accumulated by mayors in office, results indicate that they were 
only influential in the early years of democracy. This result is in line with Brender 
and Drazen (2005), since it may result from the lower transparency in the grants 
distribution process during the early years of democracy, and voters’, as well as 
competing political parties’ inexperience with electoral politics. 
However, contrary to Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding in a panel of 
countries, data for Portugal suggests that opportunistic effects in grants were much 
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smaller in the early years of democracy than afterwards23. This result is not 
surprising if we take into account the political environment and the lack of 
transparency in intergovernmental grants. During the “new democracy” period, six 
legislative elections took place and none of the parties achieved an overall majority 
of votes. It was a period of high political instability when the uncertainty about the 
timing of elections turned it difficult for the incumbent party to plan and implement 
electoral policies. Furthermore, as time goes by learning about the democratic 
system is not restricted to voters. Politicians also acquire greater experience and 
their ability to implement electoral policies may rise. It is also worth mentioning Alt 
and Lassen’s (2005) result that, conditioning on the degree of fiscal policy 
transparency, electoral cycles exist in advanced industrialized economies. 
Portuguese democracy has matured over the last thirty years, elections are free 
and there is freedom of press, but intergovernmental grants, given their specificity, 
are still an obscure topic for most Portuguese voters. Therefore, it is appealing for 
incumbents to manipulate them in order to improve reelection prospects. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Portugal is an excellent laboratory to test Brender and Drazen’s (2005) 
finding, on a panel of countries, that political budget cycles are phenomena of new 
democracies. Democracy was re-established in Portugal in 1974, allowing us to 
observe a transition from a new to an established democracy. Using an unexplored 
and detailed sample consisting of all Portuguese mainland municipalities, for the 
1979 to 2002 period, we investigate the impact of political factors in the allocation 
of intergovernmental grants and whether they have changed over time. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
22 During this period there were six legislative elections (see table 1). 
23 Wald tests allow us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in all cases. To test the robustness’ of 
these results we divided the panel into two sub samples, according to the periods considered. Estimation 
results confirm that grant increases in electoral years are stronger during the 1988-2002 period. 
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 Our results present strong evidence that political factors exert an important 
role in this distribution process, particularly for non-formula grants, and that their 
relative importance has changed from the early years of democracy to the latter 
ones. During the early years of democracy, municipalities ruled by mayors that 
belonged to the prime-minister’s party were favoured in the distribution process 
and more experienced mayors were able to extract larger amounts of grants to 
their municipalities. These phenomena are no longer visible in the established 
democracy period. However, increases in the amount of grants transferred to 
municipalities during municipal and legislative election years are larger in the 
second period of the sample (1988-2002), than in the first one (1979-1987).  
The reduction of partisan effects in the allocation of grants, and of the ability 
of mayors who stayed longer in office to extract more grants, goes in the expected 
direction. That is, as democracy matured governments’ political manipulations 
when distributing the total amount of the “pie” among municipalities diminished. 
However, opportunist effects increased over time. This result may be associated 
with politicians’ acquisition of knowledge about electoral politics, and to the 
reduction of political instability. In the later years of the sample, strong single party 
governments managed to stay in office during their entire terms. Opportunism is 
more attractive for a single-party government than for a coalition government, and 
the ability of a strong single party-government to implement electoral policies is 
also larger. Regarding voters, this result suggests that the transfer of resources 
between different levels of governments is still an obscure topic, making it difficult 
for them to see through the electoral policies and punish opportunistic incumbents 
at elections. This is an issue that deserves further attention in order to implement 
measures that enhance voters’ knowledge about intergovernmental grants, reduce 
the scope of strategic behaviour by incumbent politicians, and the losses in welfare 
they may generate.  
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Table 1: Legislative elections and parties in government 
Dates of elections 
Winning 
party 
Share in 
Parliament 
Prime Minister Form of government 
April 25, 1976 
- 
- 
December 2, 1979 
October 5, 1980 
April 25, 1983 
October 6, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
March 17, 2002 
February 20, 2005 
PS 
- 
- 
AD 
AD 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
43% 
- 
- 
51.2% 
53.6% 
40.4% 
35.2% 
59.2% 
58.7% 
48.7% 
50.0% 
45.7% 
52.6% 
Mário Soares 
Mota Pinto 
M. L. Pintassilgo 
Sá Carneiro 
Pinto Balsemão 
Mário Soares 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
Durão Barroso(a) 
José Sócrates 
One party, minority 
Pres. appointment (1978-79) 
Pres. appointment (1979-80) 
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM), majority 
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM), majority 
Coalition (PS+PSD), majority 
One party, minority 
One party, majority 
One party, majority 
One party, minority 
One party, minority 
Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP), majority 
One party, majority 
 
Source: National Elections Commission. 
Notes: PPD/PSD - People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; PS - 
Socialist Party; CDS/PP - Democratic and Social Center / People’s Party; PPM 
- Monarchic People’s Party; AD = PSD + CDS + PPM. 
 (a) In July 2004 Durão Barroso resigned and a new government, also a 
coalition of PSD and CDS/PP was formed under the leadership of Santana 
Lopes. 
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Table 2: Allocation criteria of unconditional grants to municipalities  
 
Law n. 1/79 
 
Law n. 42/98
National Budget 
Law 2001 
 
artº 
5º.b) 
artº 
5º.c) 
Decree
-law n. 
98/84 
Law n. 
1/87 
National
Budget 
Law 
1992 FGM FCM 
FGM FCM 
FBM 
Population 50% 35% 45% 45% - - - -  - 
Population/Nights spend in 
tourism facilities 
- - - - 40% 35% - 
40%  
- 
Area 10% 15% 10% 10% 15% 30% (a) - 30%  - 
Per capita direct taxes 40% - 15% 10% - - - 10%  - 
Single Income Tax - - - - - 10% - - - - 
Fiscal need index - - - - 5% - - -  - 
Number of freguesias (b) - 15% 5% 5% 5% 15% - 15%  - 
Road Network - (c) - 10% 10% - - -  - 
Number of dwellings - - - 5% - - - -  - 
Accessibility index - - - (d) 5% - - -  - 
Needs index - 35% 20% - - - - -  - 
Socio-economic development 
index 
- - - 5% - - - 
-  
- 
Population under 15 years old - - - - 5% 5% - 5%  - 
Development index (e) - - - - - - 100% - 100% - 
Equal amount to all 
municipalities 
- - 5% 10% 15% 5% - 
-  
100% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%100%
Source: Diário da República. 
Notes: (a) weighted by a factor related to altimetry; (b) freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities; (c) included in the needs 
index; (d) included in the socio-economic development index; (e) allocated only to municipalities with an index below the 
national average. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N.Obs. Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Grants:      
Total grants (1979-2002) 6 125 239.4 165.6 14.8 1 384.9 
Non-formula grants (1984-2002) 4 483 72.5 71.3 0.0   804.2 
Political variables:      
Municipal election year 6 889 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Same party 6 877 0.4 0.5 0 1 
Years in office 6 870 6.4 4.9 1 27 
Legislative election year 6 888 0.4 0.5 0 1 
Demographic-economic      
Population (thousands) 6 893 34.7 59.9 1.9 808.0 
Population squared 6 893 4 794.0 31 599.0 3.4 652 928.6 
% Population under 15 years-old 6 888 19.0 4.7 7.5 36.6 
% Population over 65 years-old 6 888 17.5 5.9 5.4 41.7 
GDP per capita at 1995 prices 6 889 6 994.5 2 090.7 4 072.2 10 053.1 
Sources: DGAL, INE, IMF and STAPE. 
Note:All types of grants are expressed in euros (at 1995 prices) per capita. 
 Data for grants goes from 1979 to 2002, for the remaining variables from 1979 
to 2003. 
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Table 4: Estimation results for total grants (1979-2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    GRANT(-1) .76 
(24.0)*** 
.76 
(24.6)*** 
.75 
(23.2)*** 
    MUN_ELECT 8.68 
(4.78)*** 
 17.85 
(6.97)*** 
    MUN_ELECT*SAME_PARTY  5.57 
(2.19)** 
 
    MUN_ELECT*DIF_PARTY  11.40 
(4.15)*** 
 
    PREVIOUS_MUN_ELECT   16.81 
(5.95)*** 
    LEG_ELECT  10.85 
(7.53)*** 
 25.15 
(8.11)*** 
    LEG_ELECT*SAME_PARTY  14.00 
(6.15)*** 
 
    LEG_ELECT*DIF_PARTY  8.11 
(3.71)*** 
 
    PREVIOUS_LEG_ELECT   10.71 
(3.82)*** 
    SAME_PARTY 2.32 
(1.04) 
1.99 
(.72) 
2.42 
(1.08) 
    YEARS_IN_OFFICE 1.46 
(2.72)*** 
1.50 
(2.79)** 
1.66 
(2.96)*** 
    POPULATION(-1) -.18 
(-2.08)** 
-.18 
(-2.09)*** 
-.20 
(-2.08)** 
    POPULATION_SQ(-1) .0002 
(1.67)* 
.0002 
(1.69)* 
.0002 
(1.67)* 
    %_POP_UNDER15(-1) 2.60 
(3.30)*** 
2.58 
(3.36)*** 
2.47 
(3.03)*** 
    %_POP_OVER65(-1) 6.32 
(6.48)*** 
6.20 
(6.51)*** 
6.43 
(6.42)*** 
    GDP(-1) .01 
(8.02)*** 
.01 
(8.09)*** 
.01 
(8.00)*** 
    m1 -8.08 -8.14 -8.04 
    m2 .59 .57 .63 
    Sargan (p-value) .13 .19 .12 
    No. Observations 5 995 5 995 5 995 
    No. Municipalities 275 275 275 
    
Notes:- Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the 
equations in first-differences with the equation in levels), using the 
econometric software PcGive 10.4; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. 
- Sargan is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the 
GMM estimators, asymptotically distributed as χ2. P-value is reported. 
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 Table 5: Estimation results for non-formula grants (1984-2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      GRANT(-1) .30 
(8.92)**
* 
.30 
(8.94)*** 
.30 
(9.05)*** 
.30 
(9.00)*** 
.30 
(8.91)*** 
      MUN_ELECT 10.24 
(6.42)**
* 
10.23 
(6.17)*** 
10.25 
(6.29)*** 
 12.41 
(4.90)*** 
      MUN_ELECT*SAME_PARTY    8.79 
(3.23)*** 
 
      MUN_ELECT*DIF_PARTY    11.20 
(4.91)*** 
 
      PREVIOUS_MUN_ELECT     3.87 
(1.14) 
      LEG_ELECT  3.41 
(2.31)** 
3.41 
(2.30)** 
3.27 
(2.23)** 
 6.01 
(1.77)* 
      LEG_ELECT*SAME_PARTY    4.76 
(2.02)** 
 
      LEG_ELECT*DIF_PARTY    2.36 
(1.13) 
 
      PREVIOUS_LEG_ELECT     2.33 
(.65) 
      SAME_PARTY 2.01 
(.94) 
2.02 
(.95) 
2.02 
(.94) 
2.07 
(.84) 
2.18 
(1.02) 
      YEARS_IN_OFFICE .82 
(2.29)** 
.81 
(2.26)** 
.85 
(2.25)** 
.82 
(2.31)** 
.73 
(1.95)* 
      %VOTES_GOV  -.12 
(-.04) 
   
      THOUSAND_VOTES_GOV   -.12 
(-1.07) 
  
      POPULATION(-1) -.18 
(-2.50)** 
-.18 
(-2.57)*** 
-.14 
(-1.78)* 
-.18 
(-2.54)*** 
-.19 
(-2.64)*** 
      POPULATION_SQ(-1) .0002 
(1.69)* 
.0002 
(1.74)* 
.0002 
(1.66)* 
.0002 
(1.72)* 
.0002 
(1.78)* 
      %POP_UNDER15(-1) .32 
(.40) 
.32 
(.40) 
.71 
(.77) 
.30 
(.37) 
-.07 
(-.09) 
      %POP_OVER65(-1) 2.98 
(4.04)**
* 
2.97 
(4.05)*** 
3.20 
(4.15)*** 
2.95 
(4.04)*** 
2.75 
(3.66)*** 
      GDP(-1) .01 
(8.37)**
* 
.01 
(8.33)*** 
.01 
(8.15)*** 
.01 
(8.40)*** 
.01 
(7.86)*** 
      m1 -7.15 -7.15 -7.17 -7.17 -7.11 
      m2 -.80 -.79 -.77 -.80 -.76 
      Sargan (p-value) .15 .15 .15 .17 .16 
      No. Observations 4 732 4 732 4 732 4 732 4 732 
      No. Municipalities 275 275 275 275 275 
      
Notes:- Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine 
the equations in first-differences with the equation in levels), using the 
econometric software PcGive 10.4; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
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- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
 31
Table 6: Total grants: new versus (1979-1987) established democracy 
(1988-2002) 
MUN_ELECT_NEW_DEM -4.85 
(-2.46)** 
  MUN_ELECT_ESTAB_DEM 16.86 
(6.42)*** 
  LEG_ELECT_NEW_DEM 4.85 
(2.87)** 
  LEG_ELECT_ESTAB_DEM 14.23 
(5.69)*** 
  SAME_PARTY_NEW_DEM 9.81 
(4.13)*** 
  SAME_PARTY_ESTAB_DEM -.86 
(-.32) 
  YEARS_IN_OFFICE_NEW_DEM 3.04 
(4.48)*** 
  YEARS_IN_OFFICE_ESTAB_DEM .74 
(1.54) 
  m1 -8.12 
  m2 .42 
  Sargan (p-value) .81 
  No. Observations 5 995 
  No. Municipalities 275 
  
Notes:- Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine 
the equations in first-differences with the equation in levels), using the 
econometric software PcGive 10.4; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
